|Title:||Uncontained engine failure, Continental Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-10, N68041, Tucson, Arizona, May 2, 1972|
|Micro summary:||This McDonnell Douglas DC-10 experienced an uncontained engine failure including the near-total loss of the #2 engine from the airplane.|
|Event Time:||1972-05-02 at 1252 MST (approx)|
|Publishing Agency:||National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)|
|Diversion Airport:||Tucson International Airport, Tuscon, Arizona, USA|
|Site of event:||Holding, 5000 MSL in Ryan Radio Beacon holding pattern|
|Departure:||Tucson International Airport, Tuscon, Arizona, USA|
|Destination:||Tucson International Airport, Tuscon, Arizona, USA|
|Airplane Type(s):||McDonnell Douglas DC-10|
|Type of flight:||Revenue|
|Diverted to:||Tucson International Airport, Tuscon, Arizona, USA|
|Executive Summary:||Continental Airlines, Inc., McDonnell Douglas DC-10, N68041, on a crew training flight, departed from Tucson International Airport (TUS), Tuscon, Airzona, at 1152 mountain standard time, on May 2, 1972. There were nine persons on board the flight.|
Approximately 1 hour after departure, the No. 2 engine low-pressure turbine assembly, turbine rear frame, and reverser assembly separated from the aircraft. The crew conducted a standard in-flight engine shutdown procedure and landed the aircraft a Tucson International Airport without further incident at 1306 mountain standard time. There were no injuries.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this incident was the failure of a stiffener ring on the pressure tube located within the high-pressure turbine shaft of No. 2 engine. This failure resulted in a condition of rotor imbalance which precipitated a sequence of component failures culminating in separation of the aft portion of the engine.
As a result of the Investigation of this incident, the Safety Board recomended to the Federal Ariation Administrator on June 22, 1972, that the provisions of General Electric Service Bulletin (CF-6) 72-177, which proposed adding a sleeve tube to strengthen the high-pressure turbine pressure tube, be enforced at an early date. The Board farther reconmended that "C" sump borescope inspection and engine oil consumption monitoring, similar to the procedures reconmended In General Electric Alert Service Bulletin (CF6-6) A72-273, with attendant appropriate action, be required until an improved "C" sump assembly is provided.
|Learning Keywords:||Operations - Maintenance|
|Operations - Training Flight|
|Systems - Engine - Uncontained Engine Failure|
|Other - Manufacturing Issues|
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