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| Title: | Runway overrun, Capitol International Airways, Inc., DC-8-63F, N4909C, Anchorage, Alaska, November 27, 1970 |
| Micro summary: | This DC-8-63F overran the runway on takeoff and was destroyed. All main landing gear wheels failed to rotate. |
| Event Time: | 1970-11-27 at 1705 AST |
| File Name: | 1970-11-27-US.pdf |
| Publishing Agency: | National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) |
| Publishing Country: | USA |
| Report number: | NTSB-AAR-72-12 |
| Pages: | 49 |
| Site of event: | 3400' beyond end of RWY 6R |
| Departure: | Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska, USA |
| Destination: | Yokota Air Force Base, Tokyo, Japan |
| Airplane Type(s): | Douglas DC-8-63F |
| Flight Phase: | Takeoff |
| Registration(s): | N4909C |
| Operator(s): | Capitol International Airways |
| Type of flight: | Revenue |
| Occupants: | 229 |
| Fatalities: | 47 |
| Serious Injuries: | 49 |
| Minor/Non-Injured: | 133 |
| Other Injuries: | 0 |
| Executive Summary: | Capitol International Airways, Inc ., Flight C2C3/26, of November 27, 1970, a Douglas DC-8-63, N4909C, crashed and burned at approximately 1705 A.s .t., following an unsuccessful takeoff attempt from Runway 6R at the Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The flight was being operated as a Military Airlift Command (MAC) contract flight from McChord Air Force Base, Tacoma, Washington, to Cam Ranh Bay, Republic of South Viet Ham, with en route refueling stops at Anchorage, Alaska, and Yokota, Japan. The investigation disclosed that the aircraft failed to become airborne during the takeoff run and overran the end of the runway. It continued along the ground and struck a low wooden barrier, the instrument landing system (ILS) structure, and a 12-foot deep drainage ditch before coaing t o a stop approximately 3,400 feet beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed in the intense ground fire which developed subsequent to the crash. There were 219 military passengers (including six dependents) and a crew of 10 aboard the aircraft. Forty-six passengers arid one flight attendant received fatal injuries as a result of the post-crash fire. At the time of the takeoff, a very light freezing drizzle was occurring at the airport. Runway 6R was covered with ice with braking action reported as fair to poor. Following the accident, tire skid marks, degraded rubber and shredded tire casings were found over most of the length of the runway. PROBABLE CAUSE The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the aircraft to attain the necessary airspeed to effect lift-off during the attempted takeoff. The lack of acceleration, undetected by the crew until after the aircraft reached V1 speed, was the result of a high frictional drag which was caused by a failure of all main landing gear wheels to rotate. Although it was determined that a braking pressure sufficient to lock all of the wheels was imparted to the brake system, the source of this pressure could not be determined. Possible sources of the unwanted braking pressure were either hydraulic/brake system malfunction or an inadvertently engaged parking brake. RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration take the following actions: (a) Determine and implement takeoff procedures that will provide the flightcrew with time or distance reference to appraise the aircraft's acceleration to the V1 speed. (b) Initiate action to incorporate in its airworthiness requirements, a provision for fuel system fire safety devices which will be effective in the prevention and control of both in-flight and post-crash fuel system fires and explosions. The Board further recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration in cooperation with the aircraft manufacturers and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, utilize the results of extensive research and accident investigation data to develop and implement major improvements in the design of transport aircraft interiors. Of particular concern are the crashworthiness of galley equipment stewardess seats and restraining devices, and the flammability of cabin interior materials. |
| Learning Keywords: | Operations - Rejected Takeoff after V1 |
| Operations - Runway Overrun | |
| Systems - Braking Systems | |
| Systems - Hydraulics | |
| Consequence - Hull Loss |
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