|Title:||Runway overrun, Incident involving aircraft UK76824, 27 December 1998, at the Stockholm/Skavsta Airport, D county, Sweden|
|Micro summary:||Miscommunication and misset expectations between ATC and the airplanes results in a late landing and runway overrun.|
|Event Time:||1998-12-27 at 0643 UTC|
|Publishing Agency:||Swedish Accident Investigation Board (AIB)|
|Report number:||RL 2000:05 e|
|Site of event:||Stockholm-Skavsta airport, D county|
|Departure:||Domodedovo International Airport, Moscow, Russia|
|Destination:||Stockholm-Skavsta Airport, Nykoping, Sweden|
|Airplane Type(s):||Ilyushin IL-76TD|
|Operator(s):||Uzbekistan Havo Yullari|
|Type of flight:||Cargo|
|Executive Summary:||The flight departed the Moscow/Domodedovo airport on the 27 December 1998 at around 0500 hrs. in the morning, bound for the Stockholm/Skavsta airport. Onboard were seven crew members and two loading personnel. The commander was the flying pilot for the flight. |
When approaching the airport the flight was asked by Stockholm Control to reduce speed as snow clearance operations were in progress. When the flight was approximately 30 nm. from the airport ATC cleared the flight to descend to 2,500 ft altitude on a QNH setting of 984 hPa and to join the standard hold over the “PEO” NDB- navigation beacon to the east of the airport. The controller also informed the crew that the braking action had been measured at 0.25/0.25/0.28 along the runway and asked if it was their intention to carry out the approach to runway 27. The controller interpreted the crew’s response as being that they were indeed ready and clearance for a direct approach was given. They were then handed over to the duty AFIS-operator at the airport. The AFIS-operator informed the crew about the braking action and the fact that the runway was covered by 5 mm. of snow. When the crew reported that they were established on the ILS they were informed that the wind was 190 degrees at 13 knots and told that they were cleared to land.
The aircraft approached the runway fast, with a noticeable bank angle applied. It touched down about halfway down the runway. The aircraft continued its rollout with no real reduction in speed, went off the runway at the runway end and finally came to rest 75 m. beyond the runway end.
The investigation shows that a clear misunderstanding arose between the crew and the air traffic controllers with regard to both communication and the distribution of responsibility. It has also been established that the approach to the airport was not performed in accordance with standard procedures. The aircraft descended below the prescribed minimum height before it was established on the ILS. The approach was rushed and when passing the threshold the aircraft's speed was 30-40 km/h too fast and height 60 m too high. This resulted in the aircraft touching down about halfway (1,270 m) down the runway. Since the runway was slippery the crew did not manage to bring the aircraft to a rest until it was around 75 m. beyond the runway end, despite the fact that full braking and engine reverse was used.
No technical fault has been found on the aircraft.
The incident was caused by the aircraft landing too far down the runway and the braking coefficient being low. Contributing was that the approach was not flown according to standard procedures and that a missed approach was not executed when the aircraft was not stabilized on the ILS at the prescribed minimum height.
|Learning Keywords:||Operations - Airspace - Air Traffic Control|
|Operations - Runway Overrun|
|Operations - Slippery Runway, Taxiway, Apron|
|Operations - Unstabilized Approach|
Accident Reports on DVD, Copyright © 2006 by Flight Simulation Systems, LLC. All Rights Reserved. All referenced trademarks are the property of their respective owners.www.fss.aero