Event Details


Title:Near ground collision, Incident involving aircraft HB-JAY and SE-ISR at Stockholm/Arlanda airport, AB County, Sweden, on the 16th of December 2002
Micro summary:A mistake nearly results in a ground collision.
Event Time:2002-12-16 at 0607 UTC
File Name:2002-12-16-SE.pdf
Publishing Agency:Swedish Accident Investigation Board (AIB)
Publishing Country:Sweden
Report number:RL 2003:32e
Pages:6
Site of event:Stockholm/Arlanda
Latitude/Longitude:5938N 01755E
First AirplaneSecond Airplane
Departure:Stockholm-Arlanda Airport, Marsta, SwedenUnknown
Destination:EuroAirport Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg, Basel/Mulhouse, FranceStockholm-Arlanda Airport, Marsta, Sweden
Airplane Type(s):Embraer EMB-145LUSaab 340
Flight Phase:TaxiTaxi
Registration(s):HB-JAYSE-ISR
Operator(s):Swiss International AirlinesSkyways AB
Type of flight:RevenueRevenue
Occupants:3032
Fatalities:00
Serious Injuries:00
Minor/Non-Injured:3032
Other Injuries:00
Executive Summary:The aircraft HB-JAY, with flight number LX 1223, was parked at gate 69L of Terminal #2 at Stockholm/Arlanda airport and was being prepared for a flight to Basel. Upon radio contact with air traffic control on the GND (Ground West) frequency, the pilots received clearance to taxi to the holding position of runway 08 with the clearance ”Swiss 1223 taxi to holding position runway 08”.

During this time the aircraft SE-ISR, with flight number SKX 300, landed on runway 01L. After landing the aircraft left the runway via exit YD.

When the pilots contacted GND for taxi directions they received the instructions ”Express 300, morning, taxi to Sierra 75 hold before Alfa”. This clearance was acknowledged. They continued taxiing via taxiway ZH and Z southbound towards the S 75 parking stand. While taxiing the pilot in command requested that the first officer shutdown the left-hand engine. As the aircraft approached terminal 3, initially the pilot in command did not observe LX 1223, due to an aircraft, which was parked on stand 59. However he did see an aircraft that taxied out from the ramp situated behind the terminal. He also observed that a so-called marshaling vehicle had been pre-positioned and was waiting for them beyond taxiway A, according to the normal routine (See depiction below).

LX 1223 taxied out on taxiway A behind another out-taxiing aircraft from the ramp. When LX 1223 approached the intersecting taxiway Z, the first officer aboard the aircraft detected SKX 300 approaching from theright without stopping. He shouted ”stop” and the pilot in command had to perform a heavy braking in order to avoid a collision. The aircraft commander estimated the minimum distance between the aircraft was approximately 3 meters.

The first officer reported the occurrence to the air traffic controller who reiterated to the pilots in SKX 300 that they were only cleared to taxiway A. The pilot in command in SKX 300 was aware that they were only cleared to taxiway A. Consequently, the crossing of taxiway A took place involuntarily and unconsciously. The first officer in SKX 300 was occupied with the shutdown of the left-hand engine and first became aware of the situation when the pilot in command applied the brakes after passing the taxiway.

The runway and taxiway system at Stockholm/Arlanda airport is complicated, with a large number of differing types of ”intersections” where mistakes can be made. Even among pilots who frequently use the airport, there is the opinion that the taxiway system design and markings and the traffic flow make it ”difficult” to operate there.

Traffic on the ground is controlled from two air traffic controller positions, GND/WEST and GND/NORTH, with responsibility for the western and northern portions of the airport respectively. This means that crews are often required to change ground control frequency in order to receive further clearances during taxi operations. It rather often happens, in connection with taxiing between the different portions of the airport, that pilots forget to hold at appointed positions. From the tape recording of the incident in question it is evident that such a mistake was made by another crew at intersection ZK less than one minute after the incident under investigation here. The number of such occurrences that remain unreported is unknown.

Out-taxiing from Terminal 2 shall, according to the AIP3, take place via taxiway U (see below). In order to shorten the taxi distance for departures from the northern portion of the airport, it is customary that crews request to taxi out via taxiway A, which is often accepted by the air traffic control. The aircraft taxiing out ahead of LX 1223 was cleared to taxi out via taxiway A without having requested this.

Conclusions
The pilot in command on SKX 300 was fully aware of the fact that they were only cleared up to taxiway A. All factual information indicate that it was simply a mistake on his part that they crossed the taxiway without clearance and therewith caused the near-collision incident.
Learning Keywords:Operations - Airspace - Air Proximity
Operations - Airspace - Air Traffic Control

 




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