|Title:||Runway overrun, Serious incident occurring January 19, 2004 at Frankfurt-Hahn involving a DC-10-40F|
|Micro summary:||DC-10 freighter overruns due to a slippery runway.|
|Publishing Agency:||Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU)|
|Site of event:||Frankfurt-Hahn|
|Departure:||Novosibirsk Tolmachevo Airport, Novosibirsk, Russia|
|Destination:||Frankfurt-Hahn Airport, Kirchberg, Germany|
|Airplane Type(s):||McDonnell Douglas DC-10-40F|
|Type of flight:||Revenue|
|Executive Summary:||On 19 January 2004 at 14:15 hrs 1 the airplane coming from Novosibirsk with about 60 t of cargo aboard touched down on runway 21 at Frankfurt-Hahn airport. Five crew members, two pilots, two flight engineers and one loadmaster, were aboard the airplane. At the time of landing it was snowing. Based on the braking coefficients broadcast by the airport automatic terminal information service (ATIS) the crew assumed medium braking action on the first third and good braking action on the second third and last third of the runway.|
Several flight crews who landed after snow removal from the runway at 13:15 hrs reported to the tower controller that they had the impression that the runway condition relating to braking action was Medium. The tower controller transmitted this information to two other airplanes, which landed immediately prior to the DC10, but not to the crew of the DC10.
The crew had calculated the landing distance for a dry and a wet runway, only. In view of the runway condition information broadcast by ATIS, the landing distance for a contaminated runway had not been calculated.
The approach was made with the autopilot switched on. With the first visual reference to the ground at approximately 300 ft GND, the pilot-in-command took over manual control and the airplane touched down within the touchdown zone of runway 21. Speed was reduced by means of the automatic braking system (Auto brake). When thrust reversal of the three engines was activated, the thrust reverser of the lefthand engine jammed in transition and failed. Thus the pilot had to reduce thrust on the right-hand engine so that only thrust reversal of the centre engine was fully available.
According to statements of the crew, braking action for the second half of the runway was poor; that part of the runway was covered with snow. The crew of a Boeing 737, which had landed four minutes prior to the DC 10, stated that at the time of their landing the first half of the runway was covered with isolated patches of snow whereas the end of the runway was completely covered with snow. The crew of the B 737 had no difficulties in stopping the aircraft as they did not reach the snow covered portion of the runway.
Thrust reversal was applied until the airplane came to a stop. On engines 1 and 3 a compressor stall occurred and reflections of fire on the engines were visible. The tower controller observed reflections of fire in the snow cloud whirled up by the engines and alerted the fire brigade who immediately proceeded to the airplane.
The airplane rolled over the 300-meter long overrun area onto an adjacent approximately 300-meter long asphalted area. At the end of this area the pilot-incommand steered the airplane to the left in order to avoid a localizer antenna and a row of red warning lights. During this manoeuvre the airplane got into unpaved terrain with its left main landing gear, the centre and the nose landing gear and was slightly damaged.
Immediately after the airplane had come to a stop, the pilot-in-command, the co-pilot and the flight engineer went to the beginning of the runway in order to establish touchdown. According to their statements, touchdown was within the touchdown zone.
The airplane was properly certificated, its equipment was in compliance with the legal provisions.
The landing mass of 190 t was within the allowable range (maximum allowable landing mass 192.3 t).
Clearing and de-icing of the runway had been concluded approximately 1 hour prior to the landing.
The chemical de-icing agent was applied to the runway section by section with different concentrations.
At the time of the landing it was snowing; the runway was partly covered with snow.
The values of runway surface friction had been broadcast by ATIS in the wrong order (opposite to the landing direction) with the section designation letters of the measurement.
Information that the runway was contaminated with snow or slush had not been given.
A calculation of the landing distance required on a contaminated runway had not been made. The calculation documents were not available to the crew.
The calculation of the LDR congruent with the actual runway condition determined that the LDA was only sufficient if thrust reversal of all three engines was applied.
The left-hand thrust reverser jammed during extension and thus was not available as a braking support.
As a result of the asymmetric braking action the right-hand thrust reverser could not be fully used.
A go-around procedure had not been taken into consideration by the crew.
The DC10 overran the end of the runway and the 300-meter stop way onto an asphalt covered area of 300 m length, which did not belong to the published runway length and which had not been cleared of snow.
During a manoeuvre to avoid a localizer antenna the airplane veered to the left of the runway into unpaved terrain causing damage to one wheel of the nose landing gear.
Due to the contamination and the resulting poor braking action, the landing distance available sufficient. The crew was insufficiently or incorrectly informed about the runway condition.
|Learning Keywords:||Operations - Runway Overrun|
|Operations - Slippery Runway, Taxiway, Apron|
|Systems - Engine - Compressor surge/stall|
|Systems - Engine - Contained Engine Failure|
|Systems - Engine Fire|
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