|Title:||Tire failure and systems damage on takeoff, Airbus A320-212, G-JDFW, 10 July 1996|
|Micro summary:||This Airbus A320 experienced significant damage following the shredding of a tire on takeoff.|
|Event Time:||1996-07-10 at 0117|
|Publishing Agency:||Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (AAIB)|
|Publishing Country:||United Kingdom|
|Site of event:||Alicante Airport, Spain|
|Departure:||Alicante International Airport, Spain|
|Destination:||Birmingham International Airport, West Midlands, England|
|Airplane Type(s):||Airbus A320-212|
|Type of flight:||Revenue|
|Executive Summary:||Following an uneventful flight from Manchester to Alicante, the crew of G-JDFW prepared the aircraft for the return journey. There were no problems noted during the external checks which were carried out by the first officer; the commander had completed a satisfactory external check prior to the earlier departure from Manchester. After a normal start and short taxy to Runway 10, the crew were cleared for take off. With the commander as handling pilot, power was applied for a reduced power take off and the aircraft started rolling. Engine parameters were checked satisfactorily and, in accordance with normal procedures, the first officer called "100 kt" for an airspeed check. Shortly afterwards, at an estimated 120 kt, both crew members became aware of a vibration which was increasing as ground speed increased. There were no other obvious abnormalities and the commander decided to continue the take off; V1 had been calculated as 140 kt. The vibration ceased as G-JDFW became airborne and the first officer called that they had a positive rate of climb. This was the cue for the handling pilot to call for gear retraction but the commander noted that the left gear was indicating 'red' and decided not to change the aircraft configuration. The first officer advised ATC that G-JDFW had a problem and would be returning to Alicante; he also informed them that they had a suspected tyre burst and asked for a runway inspection. Subsequently, in the climb towards the holding pattern at FL 80, the crew interrogated the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) display and noted three failures; there was a loss of the Yellow hydraulic system, the flaps were locked and there was an unsafe gear indication. The appropriate drills were reviewed and the commander briefed the senior cabin attendant (SCA) and made a PA to the passengers, advising them that the aircraft would be returning to Alicante. |
By now, the crew had considered the situation and been informed by ATC that tyre debris had been found on the runway. The commander concluded that the tyre burst had subsequently caused secondary damage to the yellow hydraulic system and to the flaps; checking the ECAM indicated that the gear was down and locked and therefore the unsafe gear light was a false indication. During these procedures,the SCA came to the flight deck to inform the commander that there was vibration being felt in the passenger cabin, at the rear and between the wings. There was no vibration felt in the flight deck but interrogation of the engine parameters revealed that the No 1 engine vibration gauge was now indicating 9.9 units. The commander retarded No 1 throttle to idle and the indication on the vibration gauge decreased to a normal reading of 0.4 units. He then gently advanced No 1 throttle open but was aware of increasing vibration and an associated reading of 3.0 units and so retarded the throttle to idle; with the throttle at idle, there was no abnormal indication or any physical vibration and the throttle was left in this position for the rest of the flight. With this additional problem, the crew declared a 'Pan' and also requested a lower altitude for the hold. This request was granted and G-JDFW descended to 6,000 feet on the QNH of 1024 mb.
Once established at the lower level, the crew again considered their situation. All the appropriate checks had been completed and the commander was confident that their current predicament had been caused by a burst tyre. The weather was good and the only outstanding problem was the vibration indications on No 1 engine when the power was increased; all other engine parameters were normal. Therefore, the commander decided to remain in the hold to reduce landing weight prior to his final approach. Once this decision had been taken, the first officer advised ATC that they would be holding for approximately 1 hour before making an approach to land and would require fire cover after landing. The commander briefed the SCA of his intentions and she then informed the rest of the cabin crew. The passengers were then advised of the situation and briefed for an emergency landing.
Once the fuel had reduced sufficiently, the commander carried out an approach to Runway 28; the wind was light and variable. The initial touchdown was gentle and on the right gear; the spoilers had not been armed and the thrust reversers were not selected. As the left gear touched the runway, braking was gently applied to the right gear. After touchdown, the crew were aware of vibration and the commander then applied braking to both gears; the commander became aware that the nose wheel steering was inoperative and used differential braking to clear the runway at the fast turn-off. As GJDFW came to a halt with the engines secured and the parking brake applied, the aircraft was quickly surrounded by the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS). There was no visible signs of fire but, within the cockpit, the brake temperatures indicated 800°C on the left gear and 400° rising to 600°C on the right gear; the RFFS applied foam to the left gear. With communications now established between the crew and the English speaking aircraft despatcher on the end of the interphone,it was decided to keep the passengers on board until the aircraft could be moved further from the runway. A tug was quickly attached and the aircraft was moved, with the fire crew still in attendance. Once well clear of the runway, the passengers were disembarked normally through the front left door.
After the crew had disembarked, the commander noted that the left inner tyre had been extensively ripped and that the left outer was deflated but still intact. He had also noted that the vibration was much heavier during the movement with the tug compared to when the aircraft was under its own power.
|Learning Keywords:||Systems - Hydraulics|
|Systems - Landing Gear|
|Systems - Landing Gear - Tires|
|Consequence - Damage - Airframe or fuselage|
|Close match:||Tire tread loss, damage, Boeing 737-436, G-DOCV|
|Uncontained engine failure, Overseas National Airways, Inc., Douglas DC-10-30, N1032F, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, November 12, 1975|
|Massive tire failure following gear retract cylinder support frame failure, McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, August 10, 2002|
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