Flight control difficulties, McDonnell Douglas MD-11-C, I-DUPA, January 14, 2003

Micro-summary: This MD-11 allegedly landed with no lateral (roll) control.

Event Date: 2003-01-14 at 1407 EST

Investigative Body: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA

Investigative Body's Web Site: http://www.ntsb.gov/

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2. Readers are advised that each report is a glimpse of events at specific points in time. While broad themes permeate the causal events leading up to crashes, and we can learn from those, the specific regulatory and technological environments can and do change. Your company's flight operations manual is the final authority as to the safe operation of your aircraft!

3. Reports may or may not represent reality. Many many non-scientific factors go into an investigation, including the magnitude of the event, the experience of the investigator, the political climate, relationship with the regulatory authority, technological and recovery capabilities, etc. It is recommended that the reader review all reports analytically. Even a "bad" report can be a very useful launching point for learning.

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National Transportation Safety Board		NTSB ID	: NYC03IA042	2	Aircraft Regist	Aircraft Registration Number: I-DUPA				
FACTUAL REPORT		Occurrer	nce Date: 01/14	/2003	Most Critical Ir	Most Critical Injury: None				
AVIATION		Occurrer	nce Type: Incide	ent	Investigated B	y: NTS	В			
Location/Time										
Nearest City/Place	State	ate Zip Code Local Time Time Zone								
Jamaica	NY	1								
Airport Proximity: Off Airport/Airstrip	Dista	nce From I	Landing Facility:		Direction Fro	m Airpor	t:			
Aircraft Information Summary					·		-			
Aircraft Manufacturer			Model/Series	3			Type of Aircraft			
McDonnell Douglas			MD-11-C				Airplane			
Sightseeing Flight: No		/	Air Medical Tr	ansport Flight:	No					
Narrative										
Brief narrative statement of facts, conditions and circumstan HISTORY OF FLIGHT	nces perti	inent to the a	ccident/incident:							
On January 14, 2003, at 1407 eastern standard time, a McDonnell Douglas MD-11-C, Italian registration I-DUPA, operated by Alitalia Airlines as flight 604, was reported to have landed with no lateral roll control at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. There were no injuries to the 3 Italian certificated pilots, 8 flight attendants, or 131 passengers. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Flight 604 was conducted on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan under 14 CFR Part 129. The flight departed from Milano, Italy at 0446. There were no reported problems with the departure or initial en route phases of the flight. According to a written statement from the captain, and a follow-up telephone interview, the flight was about 70 to 80 nautical miles east northeast of JFK, at FL 380 (38,000 feet), when he first noticed a problem. He had received a radar vector and attempted to use the auto-pilot to make the heading change. When the turn command was applied, the autopilot performed an uncommanded disconnect. The captain then elected to hand fly the airplane. However, the control wheel was free to move in the lateral or roll axis (ailerons) of the airplane. However, the control wheel was free to move in the longitudinal axis (elevator), and the rudder pedals were free to move about the yaw axis. The captain declared an emergency and requested a long approach to runway 31L at JFK. In preparation for landing, the flight crew extended the leading edge wing slats without incident. As the flap handle was positioned to extend trailing edge wing flaps, a warning light illuminated which indicated a difference between the selected flap position and the actual flap position. The flight crew elected to continue with a no-flap approach to runway 31L. The wind was aligned with the provent of wheel with a mole the provent of pride to the provent of provent or runway 31L.										
The incident occurred during the hours of daylight at 40 degrees, 38 minutes, 23 seconds north latitude, and 73 degrees, 46 minutes, 44 seconds west longitude.										
PERSONNEL INFORMATION	PERSONNEL INFORMATION									
The flight crew was certified i	n acc	cordance	e with the	Italian gove	rnment.					
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION										
The airplane was a combi configuration, with passengers in the front, and cargo in the aft portion of the cabin.										
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Narrative (Continued)		

Potable Water System

The potable water system on the airplane consisted of 4-63 gallon tanks, with 2 mounted on each side of the airplane. The number-1 system was on the left side of the airplane and number-2 system was on the right side of the airplane. The water tanks were tied together by a common manifold, and were pressurized to 40 psi with bleed air. The water tanks were located under the main cabin floorboards, adjacent to the L1 and R1 doors. The water was used at the flight attendant stations and lavatories.

The distribution plumbing for the potable water was routed below the passenger cabin floor along the length of the cabin. A water leak was traced to a failed hose in the vicinity of the 3R door. The failed hose was secured at its terminating end to the underside of the floorboard. Other water lines terminated similarly.

Floorboards

The main cabin floor was covered by removable floorboards. Floorboards that had water lines attached to their underside were identified by a silver colored cover plate about 5 inches in diameter, taped over 4-inch access holes. Removal of the cover plate allowed maintenance personnel to check what was immediately below the floorboard, and to disconnect any water lines or other items that may be attached to the underside of the floorboards.

Maintenance Manuals

Removal and installation of floorboards was covered in the MD-11 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), Section 53-21-04, Pages 401 through 407. The last revision was dated July 1, 2002. Although procedures for removal and installation of the floorboards was described, there was no information to alert maintenance personnel to look for the silver colored plates, and remove them to disconnect the underneath water lines prior to the removal of the floorboards.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was equipped with a quick access recorder (QAR), which was similar to a flight data recorder; however, it contained more information and was not crash protected. The information contained in the QAR was used in place of the flight data recorder. Examination of the data revealed that during the approach with the auto-pilot connected, aileron movement was visible on all four ailerons. The auto-pilot was disconnected at about 120 feet, and movement was observed on all ailerons through touchdown.

AIRPLANE EXAMINATION

Post-flight examination of the airplane revealed ice had encased multiple control cables in the wheel well area, including both aileron and flap control cables.

Maintenance support was supplied to Alitalia Airlines by Delta Air Lines (DAL) maintenance personnel at JFK. According to interviews conducted with the DAL mechanics who initially observed the airplane on January 14, ice was observed in all three wheel wells. One mechanic thought the amounts were about equal in each wheel well, and the other mechanic thought there was more ice in the right wheel well. The center landing gear doors were frozen shut with ice. When opened, water was observed running from a control cable exit in the center landing gear well, overhead panel.

On January 15, 2003, two other DAL maintenance personnel worked on the airplane. Interviews disclosed that ice was still visible in all the wheel wells. In the right MLG wheel well, the aileron tension regulator was covered with ice. In the center wheel well, water was observed

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Narrative (Continued)		

coming through a control cable hole.

The DAL mechanics identified the source of the water leak, and prepared the floorboards for removal. When the floorboard overlaying the water leak was initially lifted, its upward movement was restrained by the rubber hose that was connected to the underside of the floorboard. Water could be seen misting from where the hose attached to the fitting. The robber hose was not disconnected from the floorboard, and the floorboard was then lifted higher. The rubber hose pulled loose from the fitting and water came out the line with sufficient force to extend for about 6 inches. The water system was then depressurized.

A Boeing Field Service Representative (FSR) reported in part:

"...When I got to the airplane, there were two Delta mechanics already on board the airplane working to find the source of the leak. Seats, carpet and several floor panels from the aisle had already been removed (aft of the RH lavatory at door 3) and the two mechanics were in the process of removing the fasteners to the floor panel just aft of the RH lav. There was a visible flow of water draining out from under the RH floor panel aft of the lav floor panel into the bays underneath the aisle and cable runs. There was also significant pools of water present in several of the bays along the aisle (underneath the cable runs)."

"There were two holes on top of the floor panel (one near the capped water line and the other near the vacuum line), but they were small holes and difficult to view the water line through. Prior to lifting the floor panel, the two mechanics looked underneath the floor panel for a source of the leak. They were confident from the visible water flow, that the leak was coming from somewhere underneath that floor panel."

"The line was not disconnected prior to lifting the floor panel."

"Once the floor panel was lifted, the capped potable water line became fully dislodged. One mechanic covered the end of the line with his hand while the other mechanic went to turn off the water on the airplane to stop the water flow...."

Further examination revealed that a potable water line, aft of the lavatory, adjacent to door 3R, had become disconnected and the bay beneath the disconnected line, and adjacent bays were filled with water. When examined, the number-1 potable water system was at 12 percent capacity, and the number-2 potable water system was empty. Alitalia's policy was to depart with both water systems full.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Alitalia Airlines forwarded the failed water line, along with other components to the Safety Board for examination. The parts were forwarded to the Long Beach Division of Boeing Commercial Airplanes for further examination.

According to the report from Boeing, the failed hose had been kinked in more than one place. Creases in the hose were consistent with lifting of the floor panel with the hose attached.

Their report stated further:

"...The cause of failure...was excessive load applied to the crimped join between the flexible hose and its end fitting. When lifting the floor panel to which one end of the hose was attached, the hose was pulled out of the socket sufficiently to cause a leak...."

The parts were released to Alitalia Airlines on May 5, 2004.

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Narrative (Continued)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Boeing supplied the following description of the MD-11 autoflight/lateral control system interface:

"There are four ailerons on the MD-11, two on each wing. When the flaps, slats, and landing gear are retracted, a lockout mechanism keeps the outboard ailerons locked. When the wing flaps are extended to 15 degrees, or the slats are extended, or the landing gear is down and locked, the outboard ailerons are unlocked...The aileron system is designed so that if a control cable jam occurs on one side, it is possible to break away the other side, and still have aileron control on the non-jammed side. It was confirmed that the ice found in the right wheel well of I-DUPA was located in a position that prevented movement of the right side ailerons. The condition of the left aileron control cable system was not documented. At the time of the event, the MD-11 abnormal checklist did not include a section for jammed flight control. It was found that the break away force needed to split the aileron system was approximately 90 pounds on the control wheel."

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FACTUAL REPORT	Occ	urrenc	ce Date:	01/14/2003							
AVIATION	Occ	urrenc	ce Type:	Incident							
Landing Facility/Approach Informa	ation	-				[
Airport Name		Airport ID: Airport Elevation Runway Used Runway Leng							ay Length	n Ru	nway Width
John F, Kennedy, Intl	JFK	(13 Ft	. MSL	31L	-	14572	2	15	0	
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt								1		I	
Runway Surface Condition: Dry											
Type Instrument Approach: ILS-complete											
VFR Approach/Landing: None											
Aircraft Information									1		
Aircraft Manufacturer McDonnell Douglas			Model/ MD-1	′Series 1-C					Serial N 48426	Number S	
Airworthiness Certificate(s): Transport											
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle											
Homebuilt Aircraft? No Numb	per of Seats: 220	$- \bot$	Certified	d Max Gross W	/t.		625000	LBS	Number	r of Engine	es: 3
Engine Type: Turbo Fan		Eng Ge	gine Ma eneral [nufacturer: Electric			Model/Se CF6-800	ries: C2D1F		Rated Power: 60690 LBS	
- Aircraft Inspection Information											
Type of Last Inspection		Date of Last Inspection Time Since Last Inspection Hours					ours	Airframe Total Time 's Hours			
- Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) I	nformation	<u> </u>			1				+		
ELT Installed? No	ELT Operated?				ELT	Aided ir	n Locating Ac	cident S	Site?		
Owner/Operator Information											
Registered Aircraft Owner			Street A	ddress Via A. F.	Camr	narota	-Palazzina				
Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane SPA			City State Zip C								Zip Code
		+	Stroot A	Fiumicin	o Aero	porto					00050
Operator of Aircraft			Slieer	Same as	Reg'c	d Aircra	aft Owner				
Same as Reg'd Aircraft Owner			City							State	Zip Code
Operator Does Business As: Alitalia Airli	ines					Op	perator Desig	nator Co	ode: AAF	PF	•
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held:											
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s): Foreign Operation											
Operating Certificate:				Operator (Certifica	ate:					
Regulation Flight Conducted Under: Part	t 129: Foreign										
Type of Flight Operation Conducted: Sch	neduled; Internatio	onal; F	Passen	ger/Cargo							
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	AVIATI	QN		Occurron	-									
	ETYBO	No. 1		Occurren	ce rype. In	luent								
First Pilot Information														
Name						City					Stat	ie [Date of Birth	Age
On File	n File On File On File											44		
Sex: M Seat Occupied: Left Principal Profession: Civilian Pilot Certificate Number: On File														
Certificate(s): Airline Transport														
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land														
Rotorcraft	/Glider/LTA: Non													
Instrument	t Rating(s): Airpl	ane												
Instructor Rating(s): None														
Type Rating/Endorsement for Accident/Incident Aircraft? Yes Current Biennial Flight Review? 05/2002														
Medical Cert.: Class 1 Medical Cert. Status: Valid Medicalno waivers/lim. Date of Last Medical Exam: 09/2002														
- Flight Tir	me Matrix	All A/C	This Make and Model	Airplane Single Engine	Airplane Mult-Engine	Ni	ght	ht Instrument Actual S		ulated	Rotorcraft		Glider	Lighter Than Air
Total Time	e	9606	2148	510	9096								_	
Pilot In Co	ommand(PIC)	5236	2023			-							_	
Instructor											_		_	
Last 90 Da	ays	106									_			
Last 30 Da	ays	29									+			
Seatbelt L	lead? Vac	Shou	ldor Harpos				Toxico	l alogy P	erformed?	No		Se	 cond Pilot? V	
Sealbeil		Shot		s Used? Tes			TUXICO	Jiogy F	enonneu	INO		36		
Eliabt Dk	on/Itinorom/													
	an/itinerary													
Doporturo		ĸ					01414		Aline and I da			Derrert		Time Zana
Departure	Folint						State	;	Airport Ide	Airport identifier		Departure Time		
Milano									LIMC			0946		UTC
Destinatio	n						State	;	Airport Ide	entifie	r			
Same as	Same as Accident/Incident Location JFK													
Type of Clearance: IFR														
Type of Airspace: Class B														
Weather	r Information													
Source of Briefing: Company														
Method of	f Briefing: In Pers	son												
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	AVIATION		Occurrent	Occurrence Type: Incident								
Weather	Information											
WOF ID	Observation Time	Time Zone	WOF Elevat	on	WOF Di	stance From	n Accie	dent Site Direction From Accident				;
JFK	1351	EST	13 Ft.	MSL				NM			Deg.	Mag.
Sky/Lowes	t Cloud Condition: Few	1				6500 Ft. AG	iL	Condition of	of Ligi T	nt: Day		
Lowest Ce	iling: None		Ft.	AGL	Visibi	lity:	10	SM	Alti	meter:	30.08	"Hg
Temperatu	ire: -2 °C	Dew Point:	-16 °C	Wind	Direction:	300			De	nsity Altitude:	-2147	Ft.
Wind Spee	ed: 11	Gusts:		Weath	ner Condt	ions at Accio	dent S	ite: Visual C	Cond	itions		
Visibility (R	RVR): Ft	. Visibility (F	RVV)	SM	Intensity	of Precipita	ation:					
Restriction	s to Visibility: None	I										
Type of Pre	ecipitation: None											
Accident	Information											
Aircraft Dar	mage: None		Aircraft Fir	e: None	•			Aircraft Exp	olosio	n None		
Classificati	on: U.S. Registered/l	J.S. Soil										
- Injury Su	mmary Matrix	Fatal S	erious Mino	or	None	TOTAL						
First Pi	lot				1	1						
Second	d Pilot				2	2						
Studen	t Pilot											
Flight li	nstructor											
Check	Pilot											
Flight E	Ingineer											
Cabin A	Attendants				8	8						
Other C	Crew											
Passen	igers				131	131						
- TOTAL A	ABOARD -				142	142						
Other G	Ground											
- GRANE	D TOTAL -				142	142						
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Administrative Information		
Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)		
Robert L. Hancock		
Additional Persons Participating in This Accident/Incid	ent Investigation:	
Tony F James Aviation Safety Inspector - AAI-100 Federal Aviation Administration Washington, DC		
William C Steelhammer Air Safety Investigator Boeing - Long Beach Dvision Long Beach, CA		
Capt Andriano Zini Air Safety Investigator Agenzia Nazionale Per La Sicurezza Del Volo (Rome, Italy,	ANSV)	
Capt Fulvio DeMasi Alitalia Airlines Rome, Italy,		