Total electrical failure on approach, Boeing 737-232, December 15, 1998

Micro-summary: Electrical failure on approach resulted in a missed approach and difficult troubleshooting for the crew of this Boeing 737-232.

Event Date: 1998-12-15 at 1216 EST

Investigative Body: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA

Investigative Body's Web Site: http://www.ntsb.gov/

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National Transportation Safety Board	NTSB ID	MIA99IA046	5	Aircraft Regist	Aircraft Registration Number: N327DL					
FACTUAL REPORT		Occurren	ce Date: 12/1	5/1998	Most Critical I	Most Critical Injury: None				
ÁYIATIQŇ VETYBOR		Occurren	_{ce Type:} Incid	ent	Investigated B	_{3y:} NTS	β			
Location/Time										
Nearest City/Place	State	Zip Code Local Time			Time Zone					
ORLANDO	FL	3	2827	1216	EST					
Airport Proximity: On Airport	Dista	nce From L	anding Facility:		Direction Fro	m Airpor	t:			
Aircraft Information Summary										
Aircraft Manufacturer			Model/Serie	S			Type of Aircraft			
Boeing			737-232				Airplane			
Sightseeing Flight: No		ŀ	Air Medical T	ansport Flight: N	No		<u>.</u>			
Narrative										
<pre>damage. The airline transport-rated pilot-in-command (PIC), first officer (FO), 3 flight attendants, and 51 passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated from Boston, Massachusetts, about 3 hours 16 minutes before the incident. The PIC stated they were cleared for a visual approach to runway 35 at Orlando International Airport. The FO was flying the airplane. All descent and approach checklists were completed. The APU was started on base leg. The FO called for the gear and flaps 15. The airplane experienced a total loss of electrical power as the gear and flaps were extended. The APU did not start, and the battery indicated between 17 to 18 volts. The normal checklist procedures were accomplished followed by the quick reference procedures. Electrical power was unable to be restored. A go-around was initiated to continue the checklist. All communications and electrical equipment failed. The flap indicator indicated an asymmetrical setting. A flight controllability check was accomplished with no anomalies. The flight was continued and landing was made to runway 35. A left main landing gear tire blew out on rollout. The airplane cleared the runway, stopped, and was towed to the ramp.</pre>										
The Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) was removed from the incident aircraft and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory for readout and evaluation. The SSFDR indicates that the aircraft was descending through 2,700 feet on a heading of about 280 degrees when the data stops recording. The next recorded data shows the aircraft on the ground. The time gap between the last recorded data during the descent and the data recorded while the aircraft was on the ground is unknown. For additional information see NTSB Flight Data Recorder, Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation.										
A detailed inspection of the aircraft's electrical system was performed; which ultimately required the removal of numerous electrical system components for further teardown inspections, included an operational check of all related cockpit systems, and a verification flight (flight test) following all onboard troubleshooting and component replacements. The components were replaced and sent to Delta's maintenance facility in Atlanta, Georgia, for a preliminary inspection, before being sent to Boeing Aircraft Company in Seattle. Washington for further										

Testing of the No. 1 and No. 2 Generator Control Units (GCUs) revealed that the AC (alternating current) power supply input fuses (3 each), commonly referred to as point-of-regulation (POR) fuses, had blown (i.e. opened) due to excessive current and that a

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testing.

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Narrative (Continued)

blocking diode (CR910) was shorted. Although the testing was unable to determine the cause of the shorted CR910 diodes, the testing did prove that an attempt to start the auxiliary power unit (APU) with a weak (i.e. discharged) battery and shorted CR910 diodes, would result in the immediate opening of the POR fuses mounted internal to the No. 1 and 2 GCUs.

Testing of the analog cockpit DC (direct current) voltmeter revealed that the meter consistently indicated 1.5 to 2.0 volts high over its full scale deflection (i.e. 0 to 40 volts).

The battery was replaced because its voltage remained low (approximately 18 volts, unloaded) and would not accept a charge even with the new battery charger installed. According to the Delta B737 Operation Manual, Expanded Normal Checklist, a battery voltage of 23 volts minimum is required prior to the first flight of each day. Delta reported that 23 volts corresponds to the minimum battery voltage required to start the APU. Per the Delta B737 Service Check (performed every 200 flight hours), the battery is to be replaced if a voltage of 23.5 volts or less is detected.

Inspection of the battery revealed that the individual cell electrolyte levels were not visible and the battery was fully discharged. The cover of the battery case was removed to expose the top of the cells. Overall, the battery appeared to be in good condition externally. However, there appeared to be small areas of corrosion on some of the cell connections and dried electrolyte present on the tops of several cells adjacent to the cell vents. One cell cap was removed for further investigation. However, no electrolyte was visible in the cell. A quick check with a portable voltmeter taken at Boeing Aircraft, a month after the incident revealed that 19 cells measure between 1.2 and 1.3 volts. The remaining cell measured approximately 0.7 volts. •The No. 1 engine was air started and an attempt was made to bring the No. 1 generator on line. However, the attempt failed and therefore the No. 1 GCU was replaced. The generator subsequently powered up properly and was able to supply both sides of the aircraft electrical distribution system normally (i.e. No. 1 Generator Bus, No. 1 & No. 2 Transfer Bus). No faults were noted while running the No. 1 generator. The generator was loaded to over 50 AC amperes, by supplying the electric fuel pumps, landing lights, pitot heat, windshield heat, and cycling the flaps to 15 degrees without incident. The DC voltmeter indicated 28 volts, the DC ampere-meter (ammeter) indicated 0 amperes. The No. 1 engine driven generator was then shut down.

Upon replacement of the battery, the APU was started normally and its generator able to supply power to the ship's electrical system without any problems noted. Maintenance personnel were able to reset the APU generator feeder fault initially noted on the M238 annunciator panel once the generator was on line. The DC voltmeter indicated 28 volts subsequent to the APU start. The DC ammeter indicated an initial charge of approximately 50 amperes, that decreased in magnitude following the APU start.

The No. 2 engine was air started and an attempt made to bring its generator on line. The attempt was unsuccessful and therefore the No. 2 GCU was replaced. The No. 2 generator subsequently came on line and functioned normally while powering the starboard buses. The APU remained on line and powered the port buses at this time. AC bus voltages, current, frequency and battery readings were all normal throughout this testing. Maintenance personnel were able to be reset the No. 2 generator feeder fault initially noted on the M238 annunciator panel once the generator was on line. During this phase of testing, maintenance personnel witnessed a chafed No. 2 generator feeder cable short to ground, as indicated by a flash between the cable and the No. 2 engine (No. 4, 4.5, 5, & 6) bearing breather line assembly B-nut This chafing damage was previously noted during the initial examination of the airplane.

Preliminary teardown inspections of the electrical system components removed from N327DL were conducted at Delta's Technical Operations Center in Atlanta, Georgia on December 16, 1998. On January 26, 1999, Delta issued Engineering Authorization No. 376152-14, which documented the results of these component inspections. The teardown inspections were witnessed by an FAA inspector

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Narrative (Continued)

from the Delta Certificate Management Office and revealed the following significant findings:

a) The No. 1 and 2 GCUs had experienced identical failures. [i.e. Testing revealed that the POR fuses, mounted internal to each GCU, had opened due to excessive current. These fuses were replaced in order to complete the testing of each GCU using Delta automatic test equipment (ATE). Testing of both units using the ATE revealed that a blocking diode (CR910) had shorted in the battery power supply input circuitry to each of the GCUs.] Note that CR910 is a blocking diode installed in the DC (i.e. battery) power supply circuitry internal to each GCU that allows current flow from the battery to the GCU however prevents current flow in the opposite direction.

b) The battery electrolyte levels were low or non-existent in all cells. The battery voltage was below the minimum serviceable limit.

c) The cockpit DC voltmeter indicated approximately 2.0 volts high over its full scale deflection (i.e. 0 to 40 volts).

An operational check of all related cockpit systems was performed. The following anomalies were noted during these check procedures:

a) The cockpit DC voltmeter indicated 2.0 volts when de-energized. Therefore the meter was removed and replaced at the request of the NTSB. The removed indicator was shipped to Delta's maintenance facility in Atlanta, Georgia, for further testing to verify its full-scale calibration (i.e. error). Note: Although Delta does not require the periodic calibration of the cockpit DC voltmeter when installed, the meter is calibrated during overhauls.

b) During transfers of power from the No. 2 generator to the APU generator (i.e. closing of the No. 2 bus tie breaker), a No. 2 feeder fault would occur on the M268 annunciator panel. The feeder fault could be subsequently cleared with a reset at the panel. However, during the transfer of power from the No. 1 generator to the APU generator no such feeder faults were noted. Maintenance removed and replaced the No. 2 GCU and this problem was eliminated.

A verification flight was conducted prior to returning N327DL to service. The duration of the flight test was approximately 30 minutes. The landing gear were extended and retracted several times in flight as were the leading edge slats /flaps. No abnormal indications were noted throughout the flight. The approach and landing were conducted in an aircraft configuration similar to that of the incident flight and were uneventful. For additional information see NTSB Systems Group Chairman Factual Report.

The airplane was released to Mr. Rick Hoy, Delta Air Lines Inc., on December 17, 1998. All components retained for further analysis were released to Mr. Hoy on February 4, 1999.

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FACTUAL REPORT		Occurrer	nce Date:	12/15/1998								
AVIATION		Occurrer	nce Type:	ype: Incident								
Landing Facility/Approach Inform	ation											
Airport Name		Airŗ	Airport ID: Airport Elevation Runway Used Runway Lengt							n Rur	way Width	
ORLANDO INTERNATIONAL		M	00	96 Ft.	. MSL	35		10000	C	15	C	
Runway Surface Type: Concrete										•		
Runway Surface Condition: Dry												
Type Instrument Approach: NONE												
VFR Approach/Landing: Traffic Pattern												
Aircraft Information									i			
Aircraft Manufacturer Boeing			Model/ 737-2	Series 232					Serial N 23099	Number 99		
Airworthiness Certificate(s): Transport												
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle												
Homebuilt Aircraft? No Num	ber of Seats: 12	24	Certifie	d Max Gross W	/t.		119500	LBS	Number	r of Engine	s: 2	
Engine Type: Turbo Fan		Er F	ngine Ma >&W	nufacturer:			Model/Se JT8D-15	ries: 5A		Rat 15	ed Power: 500 LBS	
- Aircraft Inspection Information												
Type of Last Inspection		Da	Date of Last Inspection Time Since Last Inspection						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Airframe T	otal Time	
Continuous Airworthiness		12	12/1998 44 Hours						ours	3	9347 Hours	
- Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT)	Information											
ELT Installed? No	ELT Operated	1?			ELT A	Aided in	n Locating Ac	cident S	Site?			
Owner/Operator Information												
Registered Aircraft Owner			Street Address RODNEY SQUARE NORTH									
WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY		ſ								State	Zip Code	
			Street Address									
Operator of Aircraft			PO BOX 20706									
DELTA AIR LINES INC			City ATLANTA							State GA	Zip Code 30320	
Operator Does Business As: Operator Designator Code: DALA												
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held:												
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s): ابنا بعن	Caller/Domes	Suc										
Operating Certificate:	Operator C	Certificat	te:									
Regulation Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air Carrier												
Type of Flight Operation Conducted: Scl	heduled; Dome	estic; Pa	assenger	:/Cargo								
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F	ACTUAL RI	EPORT	Occurrence Date: 12/15/1998					7						
	AVIATI	<u>e</u>		Occurren	-									
Einet Dile	VETYBO	K.		000000	oo .ypo. m									
Name	ot information					City					State	Da	ate of Birth	Age
On File						On F	lie						Jn Flie	37
Sex: M	Seat Occupied	: Left	Pr	incipal Profes	sion: Civilia	an Pilot				Cer	tificate N	umber	r: On File	
Certificate(s): Airline Transport														
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land														
Rotorcraft/Glider/LTA: None														
Instrument	Rating(s): Airol	ane												
Instructor Rating(s): None														
Type Ratir	ng/Endorsement fo	or Accident/Ir	ncident Aircr	aft? Yes			С	Current B	ennial Fli	ght R	eview?			
Medical Co	ert.: Class 1	Medica	al Cert. Statu	us: Valid Me	dicalno w	aivers	/lim.		Date	of La	st Medic	al Exa	am: 08/1998	
- Flight Tir	me Matrix	All A/C	This Make and Model	Airplane Single Engine	Airplane Mult-Engine	Night Ins Actual		Instrument Sim	ulated	Rotorcraft		Glider	Lighter Than Air	
Total Time	9	8000	1550											
Pilot In Co	mmand(PIC)				ļ	_								
Instructor						_					_			
Last 90 Da	ays	150	150			_					_			
Last 30 Da	ays										_			
Last 24 Ho							Taula					0.000		
Seatbelt U	sed? res	Shou	Ilder Harnes	s Used? Yes	5		TOXICO	ology Pe	formed?	NO		Seco	ond Pliot? Ye	S
	an/Itinerary													
Type of Fil	Ignt Plan Filed: IF	R												
Departure	Point						State	, ,	Airport Ide	entifie	er Departure Ti		ire Time	Time Zone
BOSTON	1						MA		BOS		09	900		EST
Destinatio	n						State		Airport Ide	entifie	r			
Same as Accident/Incident Location									MCO					
Type of Clearance: IFR														
Type of Ai	rspace: Class	В												
Weather	Information													
Source of Briefing: Company														
Method of	Briefing:													
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FACTUAL REPORT				nce Date:	12/15/1	998						
	AVIATION		Occurrer	Occurrence Type: Incident								
Weather	Information											
WOF ID	Observation Time	Time Zone	WOF Eleva	ation	WOF D	stance From	n Accio	dent Site		Direction From	n Accident Site	e
мсо	1253	EST	96 F	t. MSL				0 NM	0 NM 0 Deg. 1			
Sky/Lowes	t Cloud Condition: Unk	nown				0 Ft. AG	L	Condition of	of Lig	nt: Day		
Lowest Ce	iling: Overcast		2800 F	t. AGL	Visib	lity:	10	SM	Alti	meter:	29.00	"Hg
Temperatu	ire: 16 °C	Dew Point:	9 °C	Wind	Direction:	310			De	nsity Altitude:		Ft.
Wind Spee	ed: 10	Gusts:		Weat	ner Condt	ions at Accic	lent S	^{ite:} Visual (Cond	itions		
Visibility (R	RVR): 0 Ft.	Visibility	(RVV) 0	SM	Intensit	/ of Precipita	ation: I	Unknown				
Restriction	s to Visibility: None											
Type of Pre	ecipitation: None											
.,												
Accident	Information											
Aircraft Dar	mage: Minor		Aircraft F	ire: None	;			Aircraft Exp	olosio	n None		
Classificati	on: U.S. Registered/L	J.S. Soil	I									
- Injury Su	mmary Matrix	Fatal	Serious Mi	nor	None	TOTAL						
First Pi	lot				1	1						
Second	d Pilot				1	1						
Studen	t Pilot											
Flight li	nstructor											
Check	Pilot											
Flight E	ngineer											
Cabin A	Attendants				3	3						
Other C	Crew											
Passen	igers				51	51						
- TOTAL A	ABOARD -				56	56						
Other G	Ground	0	0	0		0						
- GRAND) TOTAL -	0	0	0	56	56						
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AVIATION	Occurrence Type: Incident	
Administrative Information		
Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)		
CARROL A. SMITH		
Additional Persons Participating in This Accident/Incide	ent Investigation:	
PEDRO L DIAZ ORLANDO FSDO ORLANDO, FL 32822		
JOHN R POTTHAST DELTA AIRLINES ATLANTA, GA 30320		
RICHARD J ANDERSON BOEING COMMERICAL AIRPLANES SEATTLE, WA 98124		