|Title:||Proximity incident, Incident between aircraft LN-RON and TF-FIP in the airspace above Stockholm/Arlanda airport, AB County, Sweden, on 25 January 2002|
|Micro summary:||A Boeing 757-200 executed a missed-approach. An MD-80, meanwhile, was already taking off, and did not hear the "Abort" caution from ATC, thus creating a collision risk.|
|Event Time:||2002-01-25 at 1107 UTC|
|Publishing Agency:||Swedish Accident Investigation Board (AIB)|
|Report number:||RL 2003:01e|
|Site of event:||In the airspace above Stockholm/Arlanda, Sweden|
|Latitude/Longitude:||59.39° N 017.55°E|
|First Airplane||Second Airplane|
|Departure:||Stockholm-Arlanda Airport, Marsta, Sweden||Unknown|
|Destination:||Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, Netherlands||Stockholm-Arlanda Airport, Marsta, Sweden|
|Airplane Type(s):||McDonnell Douglas DC-9-81 (MD-81)||Boeing 757-200|
|Type of flight:||Revenue||Revenue|
|Executive Summary:||During the morning of the 25th of January 2002 at Stockholm/Arlanda airport, runway 01L was being used for departing aircraft and runway 26 for landing traffic.|
Aircraft A, an MD-81 with flight number SAS 1551, had received clearance to line-up on runway 01L to begin a flight to Amsterdam.
At the same time, aircraft B, a B-757 with flight number ICE 306, had initiated the approach to runway 26.
When aircraft B had passed the runway threshold and was at a height of a few meters over the runway, the crew initiated a missed approach due to the fact that the wind in combination with the runway conditions did not fulfill the requirements for a safe landing.
When the tower controller at position TWR-W observed that ICE 306 had passed over the threshold of runway 26, he judged that the aircraft would land and issued takeoff clearance to SAS 1551. Immediately thereafter he observed that ICE 306 had initiated a missed approach. The air traffic controller instructed SAS 1551 to stop immediately.
The pilots on board SAS 1551 did not hear the stop message, but continued the takeoff and lifted-off from the runway. When the aircraft commander leaned forward in order to reach the landing gear handle, he saw the climbing ICE 306 on the right side of the aircraft. He then assumed control of the aircraft and decreased the climb rate so that they passed beneath ICE 306. Subsequent to the near miss, the flight continued normally.
According to calculations accomplished by MUST, the minimum distance between the aircraft was 75-100 meters horizontally and about 300 meters vertically.
The investigation has revealed that SAS 1551 had received takeoff clearance and ICE 306 had received landing clearance and that the air traffic controllers handled the aircraft concerned according to applicable routines. However, the pilots on board SAS 1551 did not hear the stop message issued by the traffic controller. It has not been possible to determine in retrospect if the stop message was audible in the aircraft’s loud speaker system.
The investigation also shows that, among other things, deficiencies exist in the working methodology during the use of the runway combination with departures from runway 01L and arrivals on runway 26.
The incident was caused by takeoff clearance being issued, according to existing practice, to SAS 1551 simultaneously as ICE 306 initiated a missed approach and that the attempt to stop SAS 1551 was not apprehended by the crew in that aircraft.
|Learning Keywords:||Operations - Airspace - Air Proximity|
|Operations - Airspace - Air Traffic Control|
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