In-flight smoke and fire, Douglas DC-9-32, August 8, 2000

Micro-summary: This Douglas DC-9-32 executed an emergency landing due to an in-flight fire and smoke in the cockpit.

Event Date: 2000-08-08 at 1544 EDT

Investigative Body: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA

Investigative Body's Web Site: http://www.ntsb.gov/

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NTSB ID: DCA00MA079

Aircraft Registration Number: N838AT

Occurrence Date: 08/08/2000

Most Critical Injury: Minor

Occurrence Type: Accident

Investigated By: NTSB

Location/Time

Nearest City/Place	State	Zip Code	Local Time	Time Zone	
GREENSBORO	NC		1544	EDT	
Airport Proximity: Off Airport/Airstrip	Distance From	m Landing Facility:		Direction Fro	m Airport:

Aircraft Information Summary

Aircraft Manufacturer	Model/Series	Type of Aircraft
Douglas	DC-9-32	Airplane

Sightseeing Flight: No Air Medical Transport Flight: No

Narrative

Brief narrative statement of facts, conditions and circumstances pertinent to the accident/incident:

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

On August 8, 2000, about 1544 eastern daylight time, the flight crew of AirTran Airways flight 913, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32, N838AT, executed an emergency landing at Greensboro Piedmont-Triad International Airport (GSO) shortly after declaring an emergency due to an in-flight fire and smoke in the cockpit. An emergency evacuation was performed. Of the 58 passengers and 5 crewmembers on board, 3 crewmembers and 5 passengers received minor injuries from smoke inhalation. Five passengers and one ground crewmember received minor injuries during the evacuation. The airplane sustained substantial fire, heat, and smoke damage. The flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Greensboro, North Carolina, to Atlanta, Georgia.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

N838AT, a DC-9-32, serial number 47442, was delivered new to Turkish Airlines on August 24, 1970. It was registered to ValuJet on March 7, 1995 (ValuJet was acquired by AirTran Airways in 1997).

FIRE DAMAGE

Examination of the airplane revealed severe smoke and heat damage around the electric power center (EPC) and within the cockpit. Removal of the forward and aft EPC panels revealed heavy sooting, melted wire insulation, visibly broken wires, and localized heat damage. The lowest point of the fire damage on the cabin (aft) side of the EPC was in the upper compartment where it was noted that the aluminum stanchion brace that runs the length of that compartment was destroyed along with the AC bus feeder wires and numerous other airplane wiring bundles. No fire damage was noted in the lower aft compartment. The lowest point of the fire damage was on the cockpit side of the EPC, behind the lower right access panel where the AC ground service tie relay and the right and left heat exchanger cooling fan relays were located. The location of the fire damage is consistent with it being the point of origin for the fire.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Relay Examination and Evaluation

Examination of the relays located in the area of the fire origin (R2-53 and R2-54) revealed that R2-53, the left heat exchanger cooling fan relay, was severely heat damaged, as were the other relays in this area. However, only the R2-53 relay had loose terminal studs and several holes that had burned through the relay housing. The largest of the burn holes observed in the R2-53 relay were on the terminal "A" side directly above the wiring bundles.

Removal of the R2-53 relay cover revealed that none of the rotating contacts, or armatures,

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Narrative (Continued)

were touching the stationary contacts, indicating that the relay was in the de-energized, or open, condition. This finding suggests that, initially, the relay functioned properly by returning the rotating armature to the open position after takeoff.

Disassembly of the relay revealed that the floor between the housing upper cavity and lower cavity was heavily heat damaged. Arc damage extended around three sides of the relay; only the side containing the "C" terminals remained intact. According to the manufacturer, Leach International Corporation, the damage to the relay housing was consistent with a phase-to-phase arc between terminals "A2" and "B2" of the relay. Disassembly of the relay also revealed that one of the wires that passes between the two coils in the lower housing adjacent to the armature shaft exhibited insulation damage. No evidence was observed to suggest that the wire arced or overheated, indicating that the wire did not cause or contribute to a short in the relay.

Relay Repairs

Visual examination and disassembly of the R2-53 relay revealed numerous repairs that did not conform to Leach production standards. For example, the baseplate and coil assembly time-delay circuit were attached with four slotted screws that exhibited mechanical damage and that did not have the typical coating of sealant, some of the diodes on the time-delay circuit board appeared to be different than those used by Leach during production, nonstandard shims were installed between the relay housing and the stationary contact, and nonstandard, pre-drilled two-hole washers were found installed below the contact carrier assembly.

According to Leach, no overhaul or component maintenance manual has been released to outside repair stations or vendors for repair of this part. Leach representatives reported that their facility does not overhaul this relay but might do minor repairs as part of warranty work, such as changing the time-delay circuit board. Additionally, according to Leach, any repairs performed at the facility would require stamping the outside of the relay housing with the letter "R." No such marking was found anywhere on the R2-53 relay housing.

Disassembly of the R2-54 relay revealed many of the same nonconforming repairs noted during the examination of the R2-53 relay. During the examination of the R2-54 relay, an alphanumeric stamp, "JNR 11-17-78," was discovered on the underside of the relay cover. Leach indicated that this stamp is not a Leach repair or manufacturing mark. The repair date code indicates that the repair was performed while the aircraft was owned and operated by Turkish Airlines.

Circuit Breakers Examination and Evaluation

During the on-scene portion of the investigation, three of the four circuit breakers in the left heat exchanger cooling fan were found in the tripped position. To determine why only three of the four circuit breakers tripped, all four were submitted to the Materials Integrity Branch at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, for further examination. The circuit breakers were visually examined and were subjected to an insulation resistance measurement, a contact resistance test, a voltage drop test, and a calibration test (which measured minimum and maximum ultimate trip times). Testing and examination determined that the circuit breaker that did not trip exhibited no anomalies that would prevent normal operation, met all specifications required for the selected tests, and operated properly during the calibration test. Although this circuit breaker appeared to have functioned properly during testing, the lab report noted that, as a thermal device, the circuit breaker is designed to trip when a sustained current overload exists and that it is possible during the event that intermittent arcing or a resistive short occurred or that the circuit opened before the breaker reached a temperature sufficient to trip the device.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

As a result of this accident, AirTran inspected its entire DC-9 fleet for anomalies in the R2-53 and R2-54 relays. Five relays were removed from service due to loose terminal studs. A DC-9 fleet campaign was conducted to inspect R2-53 and R2-54 relays and to determine if relay

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Narrative (Continued)

degradation was time-related and whether a hard-time inspection was warranted. The results of the survey indicate that a hard-time service limit is not warranted; however, several relays showed clear indications that unauthorized repairs had been performed, similar to those apparently performed on the accident R2-53 relay.

The Safety Board also learned during its investigation of this accident that neither flight attendant on board flight 913 attempted to locate the source of the smoke in the cabin or to use any of the firefighting equipment available to them. It was also learned that AirTran's flight attendant training program does not include any drill involving hidden fires but does include a drill that uses a visible, open flame. Based on this accident (and others involving in-flight fires), the Safety Board issued five safety recommendations to the FAA on January 4, 2002, regarding improved crewmember training for fighting in-flight fires.

The Safety Board's investigation also revealed that after donning his oxygen mask, the first officer removed it to address the passengers on the public address system, exposing himself to the smoke and the potential for incapacitation. He reported in a postaccident interview that he continued to feel the effects of the smoke after he replaced his mask. The first officer was treated for smoke inhalation after evacuating the airplane.

National Transportation Safety Board

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FACTUAL REPORT	Occurrence Date: 08/08/2000											
AYIATION	AVIATION Occurrence Type: Accident											
Landing Facility/Approach Information												
Airport Name		Airport ID:	Airport Eleva	rport Elevation Runv		way Used Runway		ay Lengt	th	Runv	vay Width	
PIEDMONT TRIAD INTERNATIONAL		GSO	Ft.	. MSL	0							
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt												
Runway Surface Condition: Dry												
Type Instrument Approach: NONE												
VFR Approach/Landing: Precautionary Landing												
Aircraft Information												
Aircraft Manufacturer		Model/	/Series					Serial	Numbe	er		
Douglas		DC-9	-32									
Airworthiness Certificate(s): Transport												
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle												
Homebuilt Aircraft? No Number of Seats:	119	Certifie	Certified Max Gross Wt.					Number of E		ingines: 2		
Engine Type: Turbo Jet		1 -	Engine Manufacturer: Model/Series: JT8D						Rated Power: 14500 LBS			
- Aircraft Inspection Information												
Type of Last Inspection		Date of Las	Date of Last Inspection Time Since				nce Last Inspection			Airframe Total Time		
Unknown			Hours						Hours			
- Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Information												
ELT Installed? ELT Opera	ted?			ELT A	vided in	n Locating Ac	cident S	Site?				
Owner/Operator Information												
Registered Aircraft Owner		Street Address										
		City	City							е	Zip Code	
		Street A	ddress									
Operator of Aircraft		9955 AIR TRAN BLVD										
AIRTRAN AIRLINES INC		City ORLANDO							Stat FL	e	Zip Code 32827	
Operator Does Business As:	Operator Designator Code: VJ6A											
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held:												
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s): Flag Carrier/Do	nestic											
Operating Certificate:			Operator C	Certificat	te:							
Regulation Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air C	arrier											
Type of Flight Operation Conducted: Scheduled; Do	mestic	; Passenger	r Only									
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AVIATION		Occurrence Type: Accident				┨							
	A LATY BOP	(P)1		Occurren	се Туре: Ас	cident							
First Pilot Ir	nformation												
Name						City				Sta	ate	Date of Birth	Age
On File												On File	51
Sex: M S	Seat Occupied:	n Pilot			С	ertifica	te Numb	er: On File					
Certificate(s): Airline Transport; Commercial													
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land													
Rotorcraft/Glider/LTA: Helicopter													
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane; Helicopter													
Instructor Rating(s):													
Type Rating/E	ndorsement fo	r Accident/In	cident Aircraf	^{t?} Yes			Cı	urrent Bie	nnial Flight	t Revie	w? 04/2	2000	
Medical Cert.:	Class 1	Medica	l Cert. Status	: Valid Me	dicalno wa	aivers/lir	n.		Date of	Last M	edical E	xam: 06/2000	
									•				
- Flight Time I	Matrix	All A/C	This Make and Model	Airplane Single Engine	Airplane Mult-Engine	Night	Night Ac		strument Simulate	ed	Rotorcraft	Glider	Lighter Than Air
Total Time		22000	15000										
Pilot In Comma	and(PIC)		10000										
Instructor							_						
Last 90 Days													
Last 30 Days							_						
Last 24 Hours						<u> </u>							
Seatbelt Used	? Yes	Shou	lder Harness	Used? Yes		T	Toxicology Performed? Second Pilot?						
Flight Plan/l	ltinerary												
Type of Flight	Plan Filed: IFI	R											
Departure Poi	nt				-		State	А	irport Identifier Departure Time			ture Time	Time Zone
Same as Ac	cident/Incide	nt Location							(0000		
Destination							State	tate Airport Identifier					
ATLANTA						(GA ATL						
Type of Clear	ance:												
Type of Airspa	ace:												
Weather Inf	formation												
Source of Brie	Source of Briefing:												
Method of Bri	efing:												
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Occurren			currence Type: Accident									
Weather	Information											
WOF ID	Observation Time	Time Zone	WOF	Elevati	on	WOF Di	WOF Distance From Accident Site				Direction From Accid	lent Site
											Deg. Ma	
				Ft.	MSL		NM				NM	
Sky/Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear							Ft. AG	iL	Condition o	f Ligh	nt: Not Reported	
Lowest Ceiling: None					AGL	Visib	ility:	10	SM	Alti	meter:	"Hg
Temperatu	emperature: °C Dew Point:					Direction:				De	nsity Altitude:	Ft.
Wind Spee	ed: Calm	Gusts:			Weat	her Condt	ions at Accid	dent S	ite: Visual C	Cond	itions	
Visibility (F	RVR): 0 Ft.	Visibility	y (RVV)	0	SM	Intensity	y of Precipita	ation:				
Restriction	ns to Visibility:	-										
Type of Pr	ecipitation: None											
Accident	Information											
Aircraft Da	mage: Substantial		Airo	Aircraft Fire: In-flight					Aircraft Exp	losio	n None	
Classificati	ion: U.S. Registered/L	J.S. Soil	-									
- Injury Su	mmary Matrix	Fatal	Serious	Mino	r	None	TOTAL					
First Pi	ilot					1	1					
Second	d Pilot				1		1					
Studer	nt Pilot											
Flight I	nstructor											
Check	Pilot											
Flight E	Engineer											
Cabin /	Attendants				2	1	3					
Other (Crew											
Passer	ngers				10	48	58					
- TOTAL /	ABOARD -				13	50	63					
Other (Ground	0	0		0	_	0					
- GRANI	O TOTAL -	0	0		13	50	63					

National Transportation Safety Board

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Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)

Lorenda Ward

Additional Persons Participating in This Accident/Incident Investigation:

ROBERT HENLEY AAI-100